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COMMENT
REPRESENTING A CREDITOR UNDER
CHAPTER X OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
by Steve Alan Ungerman
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act gives corporations in financial dis-
tress the opportunity to reorganize more expediently and with less injury
to the debtor and its creditors than the older methods.' The reorganization
is accomplished by a scaling or rearrangement of the corporation's obliga-
tions and the shareholders' interests.' Chapter X was enacted to encourage
the freer use of reorganization procedures and to avoid unnecessary or
premature liquidations.' Its purpose, however, is to prevent a sinking cor-
poration from drowning,4 not to "place crutches under corporate cripples."'
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Reorganization (Chapter X) Versus
Arrangement (Chapter XI)
Chapter XI, providing for arrangements under the Bankruptcy Act,
offers a competing means for rehabilitation. In fact, chapter X may not be
used if it appears that adequate relief may be obtained under chapter XI.
Under chapter XI the plan may affect only the settlement, satisfaction or
extension of time for payment of unsecured debts;" chapter X plans affect
also the rights of the stockholders and secured creditors.' Chapter XI may
be used by individuals and partnerships as well as corporations, while chap-
ter X is available only for corporations.! Chapter XI is voluntary, whereas
chapter X authorizes both voluntary and involuntary proceedings."
In general, chapter XI lacks the elaborate provisions for judicial super-
vision that are found in chapter X. And chapter X reorganizations are
more complicated and expensive, and the plans may be subject to scrutiny
by the Securities and Exchange Commission, while chapter XI plans are
free of Commission jurisdiction and are usually speedier." Corporate
management remains in control in a chapter XI procedure, while under
chapter X, except in the small case, a disinterested trustee replaces man-
agement. 2 Chapter XI arrangements may become effective if approved by
a majority in number and amount of the unsecured creditors, while chap-
'Bankruptcy Act §§ 101-276, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1965),formerly 11 U.S.C. § 77B
(1934). See Duparquet Huot & M. Co. v. Evans, 297 U.S. 216 (1937).
'City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 433 (1937).
'Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 141 (1944).
4 In re Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 10 F. Supp. 414 (D. Md. 1935).
'Price v. Spokane Silver & Lead Co., 97 F.2d 237 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 626
(1938).
'Bankruptcy Act § 130(7), 146(2), 11 U.S.C. § 530(7), 546(2) (1965).
'Bankruptcy Act § 306(1), 11 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1965).
'Bankruptcy Act § 216(1), 11 U.S.C. § 616(1) (1965).
'Bankruptcy Act § 126, 306(3), 11 U.S.C. §§ 526, 706(3) (1965).
"Bankruptcy Act § 126, 11 U.S.C. § 526 (1965).
"Bankruptcy Act §§ 264(a), 116, 11 U.S.C. 5§ 664(a), 516 (1965); Securities Act of 1933,
5 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. 5 77(c) (1965).
"Bankruptcy Act § 156, 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1965).
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ter X reorganizations must be approved by two-thirds of each class of
creditors and the holders of a majority of each class of stock.'" The plan
in chapter X must pass the test of being fair, equitable, and feasible,14
while the chapter XI plan may qualify if merely feasible."5
Pertinent questions in deciding which chapter to use are:
(1) Who should control the administration of the debtor's estate and
formulate plans for its rehabilitation?
(2) Should the features of speed and economy give way to the considera-
tions of thoroughness and disinterestedness?
(3) Is there need for an independent study of the debtor's affairs by court
or trustee? ...
(4) Does the situation call for something more than arrangement of only
the rights of unsecured creditors of the debtor, without alteration of the
relations of any other class of security holders?
(5) Will effective relief probably entail rearranging the capital structure of
the corporation or will it involve only a simple composition of debts with
unsecured creditors? . . .
(6) Is there a serious question of continuing the present management of
the debtor?"6
B. Summary of a Chapter X Proceeding
A chapter X proceeding is initiated by the filing of a voluntary or in-
voluntary petition with the federal district clerk. Before the first hearing
the debtor or any creditor may file an answer controverting the petition.
At the first hearing the petition is either approved or dismissed by the
judge. If the petition is approved, a trustee is usually appointed. Credi-
tors present their claims to the court and are divided into classes. A plan
is proposed by the trustee or by creditors, and a hearing is held to consider
objections or amendments to the plan. When a plan meets all the specified
requirements, it is approved by the judge and is distributed to the credi-
tors and shareholders for their approval. If two-thirds of each class of
creditors and a majority of each class of stockholders approve the plan, a
hearing is held to consider confirmation by the court. If the judge grants
confirmation, the plan is carried into effect.
In the following pages of this Comment the procedural and substantive
law of chapter X will be examined. The purpose is to present a general
survey of chapter X with emphasis on procedures available to creditors.
II. PLEADINGS
Petition. An involuntary petition may be filed by three or more credi-
tors who have claims against a corporation or its property amounting in the
aggregate to $5,000 or over, liquidated in amount and not contingent as
"aBankruptcy Act § 179, 11 U.S.C. § 579 (1965).
4 Bankruptcy Act S 174, 11 U.S.C. § 574 (1965).
"Bankruptcy Act § 366(2), 11 U.S.C. § 766(2) (1965).
"In re Herold Radio & Electronics Corp., 191 F. Supp. 780, 786-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). For
an analysis of the leading cases in this area, see Weintraub & Levin, From United States Realty
to American Trailer Rentals: The Availability of Debtor Relief for the Middle-Sized Corporation,
34 FORDHAM L. REv. 419 (1966).
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to liability, provided that no other petition is pending under chapter X."
The Act lists the provisions which an involuntary petition must contain."'
Answer. Prior to the first date set for the hearing on the petition,"5 an
answer controverting the allegations of a petition by or against a debtor
may be filed by any creditor.' Thus, creditors may resist a voluntary peti-
tion for the purpose of preventing an unnecessary reorganization or a use-
less attempt to reorganize." By statute, the answer is limited to a denial of
one or more of the essential allegations of the petition, or to the allegation
of new matter that, in effect, operates as a denial.22 In addition an answer
may allege that the petition was not filed in good faith and the judge must
affirmatively determine this issue before approving the petition.' A failure
to so allege may preclude the creditors from subsequently raising the issue
of good faith. There is some question whether a creditor may contest al-
legations other than good faith which are required in an involuntary peti-
tion, if the debtor seeks approval of the petition. A literal reading of the
statute, however, would seem to allow such a contest."
III. APPROVAL OR DISMISSAL OF PETITION-GOOD FAITH
The judge must dismiss the petition if it does not fulfill the require-
ments of chapter X or has not been filed in good faith.2" In addition, if the
petition is challenged by an answer, the judge must also determine if the
material allegations of the petition are sustained by proof. In order to
comply with the requirements of chapter X, (1) the petition must con-
tain the allegations required by the Act," (2) the debtor must be a cor-
17 Bankruptcy Act § 126, 11 U.S.C. § 526 (1965). See Bankruptcy Act §§ 127 (filing petition
in pending bankruptcy), 128 (venue), 129 (subsidiary), 132 (filing fee), 133 (service), 11
U.S.C. 5§ 527, 528, 529, 532, 533 (1965). Note that only those corporations classified as
"moneyed, business, or commercial" under § 4b of the Bankruptcy Act are subject to an invol-
untary petition under § 126. Municipal, railroad, insurance, banking corporations, and building
and loan associations are not amenable to a reorganization. See 6 A. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ]
4.05, 4.06 (14th ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER]; 11 H. REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY 55
4416-28 (1961). Bankruptcy Act § 256, 11 U.S.C. § 656 (1965) permits the filing of a petition
notwithstanding the pendency of a prior mortgage foreclosure, prior equity, or other proceeding
in a federal or state court in which a receiver or trustee of all or any part of the debtor's property
has either been appointed or application made therefor.
'sBankruptcy Act 55 130, 131, 11 U.S.C. § $30, 531 (1965).
19 Bankruptcy Act 5 161, 11 U.S.C. § 561 (1965) provides that the judge shall fix a time
of hearing, to be held not less than thirty days and not more than sixty days after the approval
of the petition. The Act further provides that at least thirty days' notice shall be given by mail
to the creditors.
2OBankruptcy Act § 137, 11 U.S.C. § 537 (1965).
21 Moore v. Linahan, 117 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 628 (1941).
22 In re Cheney Bros., 12 F. Supp. 609 (D. Conn. 1935).
23 Manati Sugar Co. v. Mock, 75 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1935).24 See In re General Stores Corp., 147 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
2S Moore v. Linahan, 117 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 628 (1941). But see In re
Equity Co. of America, 115 F.2d 570 (7th Cir. 1940). See also 6 COLLIER 5 5.03.
2Bankruptcy Act 55 141, 142, 11 U.S.C. 5 $41, 542 (1965).27
Bankruptcy Act 55 143, 144, 11 U.S.C. 55 543, 544 (1965).
2' See In re Equity Co. of America, 115 F.2d 570 (7th Cir. 1940) (when a creditor's petition
states substantive allegations warranting approval but is technically deficient, the defects may be
cured by an answer admitting the allegations and consenting to an order of approval). See also
In re West Va. Printing Co., 11 F. Supp. 211 (D.W. Va.), mnodified, mem., 77 F.2d 1020 (4th
Cir. 1935) (the answer of debtor admitting insolvency in a prior proceeding is admissible to prove
the allegation of insolvency in a creditors' petition).
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poration eligible for reorganization, (3) the petitioners in involuntary
proceedings must be qualified, (4) the necessary jurisdictional facts as al-
leged in the petition must be found,29 and (5) a case for relief afforded
by chapter X must be presented as alleged in the petition."
The requirement that the petition must be filed in good faith has gen-
erated extensive litigation. While good faith includes the general meaning
of the term, the Act specifically states that good faith is lacking if"s (1)
the petition is filed by creditors who acquired their claims for the pur-
pose of filing the petition,"2 or (2) adequate relief may in fact be obtained
by the debtor under chapter XI,' or (3) it is unreasonable to expect that
a plan can be effected," or (4) a prior proceeding is pending where the
interest of creditors may be properly served.' The burden of proving
good faith is upon the petitioner, " and the existence of good faith is to be
" The requisite jurisdictional facts are (1) a debtor eligible for relief; (2) in the case of an
involuntary petition, petitioners having claims in the necessary amount; (3) an allegation that the
principal assets and the principal place of business have been for the preceding six months within
the territorial limits of the court; or for a longer portion of the preceding six months than in
any other jurisdiction, or if the corporation is in bankruptcy that the proceeding is pending in
the court in which the petition is filed; (4) insolvency or inability to pay debts; and (5) in the
case of an involuntary petition, grounds for filing. In re Guardian Investors Corp., 39 F. Supp.
803 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
" For cases where need for relief was established, see SEC v. United States Realty & Improve-
ment Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940); Capitol Motor Courts v. Le Blanc Corp., 201 F.2d 356 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 957 (1953); Ogilvie v. Dexter Horton Estate, 86 F.2d 282 (9th
Cir. 1936); In re Kelly-Springfield Co., 10 F. Supp. 414 (D. Md. 1935). For cases where need
for relief was not established, see Marine Harbor Properties, Inc. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 317
U.S. 78 (1942); In re Sheridan View Bldg. Corp., 149 F.2d 532 (7th Cir. 1945); In re Suburban
Properties, 110 F.2d 438 (7th Cir. 1940); Manati Sugar Co. v. Mack, 75 F.2d 284 (2d Cir.
1935).
"
5Bankruptcy Act § 146, 11 U.S.C. § 546 (1965).
"See Milwaukee Postal Bldg. Corp. v. McCann, 95 F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1938).
1
3See Bankruptcy Act § 147, 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1965) providing for transfer to chapter XL
" See Janaf Shopping Center, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 282 F.2d 211 (4th Cir. 1960);
In re Hunterbrook Bldg. Corp., 276 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1960) (where the court said that § 146(3)
does not require certainty of success, but it does require at least a fair assurance). The opposition
of some creditors to the reorganization is a factor to be weighed but is not determinative of
good faith. Corr v. Flora Sun Corp., 317 F.2d 708 (5th Cir. 1963); Janaf Shopping Center v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, supra. But see Leas v. Courtney Co., 261 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1958). For
cases where reorganization is impossible, see In re Drusilla Carr Land Corp., 101 F.2d 897 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 623 (1939); Manati Sugar Co. v. Mock, 75 F.2d 284 (2d Cir.
1935); In re Ware Metal Prods., 42 F. Supp. 538 (D. Mass. 1941).
s See Marine Harbor Properties, Inc. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 317 U.S. 78, 84 (1942) (it
must be established that "at least in some substantial particular the prior proceedings withhold or
deny creditors . . . benefits, advantages, or protection which Chapter X affords."). For cases
where pending suits were held inadequate, see In re Loeb Apartments, Inc., 89 F.2d 461 (7th Cir.
1937) (delay in prior proceeding); In re Sponsor Realty Corp., 48 F. Supp. 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)
(protection of security); In re 263 West 38th St. Corp., 37 F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)
(values existing for creditors will be better protected or perhaps enhanced by reorganization).
For cases where pending suits were held adequate, see Fidelity Assur. Ass'n v. Sims, 318 U.S. 608
(1943) (liquidation proceeding); In re Colorado Trust Deed Funds, Inc., 311 F.2d 288 (10th
Cir. 1962) (receivership proceeding); In re Sheridan View Bldg. Corp., 149 F.2d 532 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 737 (1945) (foreclosure); In re Biltmore Grande Apartment Bldg. Trust,
146 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1944) (no equity over a first mortgage in respect to which a foreclosure
suit was pending); In re Suburban Properties, Inc., 110 F.2d 438 (7th Cir. 1940) (foreclosure
proceeding); In re St. Charles Hotel Co., 60 F. Supp. 322 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 149 F.2d 645 (3d
Cit. 1945) (equity receivership); In re Reliable Estates, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 588 (E.D.N.Y. 1940)
(property being administered in state court proceeding under first mortgage). If the desired relief
is available in both proceedings, the interests of the parties will be best served in that proceeding
in which the cost will be less. See In re Williamsport Wire Rope Co., 10 F. Supp. 481 (M.D.
Pa.), appeal dismissed, 78 F.2d 1023 (3d Cit. 1935) (receivership).
" Marine Harbor Properties, Inc. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 317 U.S. 78 (1942).
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determined as of the time of filing the petition and not afterwards."'
Good faith includes a genuine need for relief under chapter X."s The
petition must not be filed for the purpose of harassing the debtor, or of
hindering or delaying creditors, or of perpetrating some fraud or evasion."
The debtor's existing value is an important factor to be considered in
determining good faith. There must be some existing value which can be
preserved before a chapter X reorganization is justified.'" Therefore, if the
debtor is hopelessly insolvent and its financial condition has so far deteri-
orated that liquidation is the only answer, the petition must be dismissed."'
A voluntary petition is filed in good faith if the debtor has a substantial
equity in the assets; ' no equity is necessary when the petition is involun-
tary."
A petitioning debtor is guilty of bad faith in seeking reorganization on
exaggerated valuations of assets." Conversely, concealment of assets also
warrants a finding that a petition was not filed in good faith.'
Authority to file a petition may affect the determination of good faith.
In the case of an involuntary petition, the fact that counsel was not au-
thorized by all named creditors to file the petition has a bearing on good
faith." Dismissal is not required, however, unless those creditors actually
do not favor reorganization and as a result do not consent to the use of
7 1n re Riddlesburg Mining Co., 224 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1955).S'Grubbs v. Pettit, 282 F.2d 557 (2d Cir. 1960); Price v. Spokane Silver & Lead Co., 97
F.2d 237 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 626 (1938).
" International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Quick Charge, 168 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1948) (good
faith lacking when a company not in financial difficulties files a reorganization petition with the
object of obtaining a general restraining order against interference with its affairs when the only
interference is by a labor union seeking collective bargaining rights); In re Cook, 104 F.2d 981
(7th Cir. 1939) (a petition filed by an indenture trustee in order to escape from an accounting
in a prior proceeding was dismissed as not filed in good faith); In re Cook, 101 F.2d 394 (7th
Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 642 (1939) (if directors merely seek to withdraw the property
from the state court's custody by filing a petition for the reorganization of the debtor, their
action is fraudulent and the petition is not filed in good faith); In rc Northeastern Water Cos.,
24 F. Supp. 653 (N.D.N.Y. 1938) (where the real purpose of the reorganization proceeding was
to hold the debtor in its present status for a time sufficient for interested parties to obtain money
to pay its debts, through the elimination and reorganization of solvent affiliated companies, the
proceeding is one to restrain creditors and not in good faith).
4°In re Julius Roehrs Co., 115 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1940); In re Drusilla Carr Land Corp., 101
F.2d 897 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 623 (1939).
4tFidelity Assur. Ass'n v. Sims, 318 U.S. 608 (1943); Goodman v. Michael, 280 F.2d 106
(lst Cir. 1960).
42In re Diversey Hotel Corp., 165 F.2d 655 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 861 (1948)
(where the best offer secured by debtor in an attempt to sell its property would cause substantial
loss to its bondholders, a majority of whom wish to see a reorganization attempted, good faith
exists); In re Mortgage Sec. Corp., 75 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1935) (corporation may maintain a
petition even though its assets have diminished to the point that junior classes of stockholders
have no interest remaining). See also Sylvan Beach v. Koch, 140 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1944) (where
a corporation had conveyed all its property to trustees to conduct its business for certain bene-
ficiaries, the giving of the trust deed constituted, in practical effect, a reorganization of the debtor,
and rendered its petition for a subsequent reorganization under chapter X a fraud on the trustees);
In re Antone Bldg. Corp., 88 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1937) (an involuntary petition is not filed in
good faith where the debtor has parted with all its property to a bondholders' committee). But
where there is a reasonable expectancy of future assets, e.g., the uncovering of new ore fields, good
faith was held to exist. White v. Penelas Mining Co., 105 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1939).
4"In re Equity Co. of America, 115 F.2d 570 (7th Cir. 1940); Wayne United Gas Co. v.
Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 91 F.2d 827 (4th Cir. 1937).
"In re Geiser Mfg. Co., 18 F. Supp. 506 (M.D. Pa. 1937).
"In re Ware Metal Prods., 42 F. Supp. 538 (D. Mass. 1941).
"In re Suburban Properties, 110 F.2d 438 (7th Cir. 1940).
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their names." There is some indication that the filing of a voluntary peti-
tion must be duly authorized by the debtor's directors."
When a business is incorporated for the express purpose of taking ad-
vantage of the reorganization provisions of chapter X, a question of good
faith is raised. One circuit has declared that such a transaction perpetrates
a legal fraud on creditors and that it is not within the purview of the
statute. 4 Another circuit, however, has taken the position that circum-
stances may warrant such a procedure. ° One leading writer has asserted
that the latter view is preferable because it exemplifies the flexible nature
of the concept of good faith."
Once good faith or any other issue raised in an answer is tried and de-
termined finally at the hearing for approval of the petition, such deter-
mination is conclusive for all purposes of chapter X." An order approv-
ing a petition operates as an automatic stay of a prior bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, mortgage foreclosure, equity receivership, or any other proceed-
ing to enforce a lien against the debtor's property." The stay is designed
to prevent creditors fr6m enforcing their security or making efforts in
other forums to liquidate or rehabilitate the debtor. A creditor may peti-
tion the judge for relief from or modification of a stay that is unfairly
hampering his interests; but such relief will not be given if it would sub-
stantially hinder or obstruct the reorganization. 4 However, a secured cred-
itor may not be held off indefinitely without some assurance that a plan
will be forthcoming."
4 Humphrey v. Bankers' Mortgage Co., 79 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1935).
4 See White v. Penelas Mining Co., 105 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1939).
4
"Milwaukee Postal Bldg. Corp. v. McCann, 95 F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1938). The Fifth Circuit
appears to follow this rule in Mongiello Bros. Coal Corp. v. Houghtaling Properties, Inc., 309
F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1962). See also In re North Kenmore Bldg. Corp., 81 F.2d 656 (7th Cir.
1936).
,'In re Loeb Apartments, Inc., 89 F.2d 461 (7th Cir. 1937). Where a state court proposed to
continue a burdensome foreclosure receivership and refused to consider any plan of reorganization,
and a bondholders' committee which had acquired title to the property from the defaulting in-
dividual mortgagor organized a corporation to take title and assume the bonded indebtedness and
then caused it to file a petition, the petition was approved as filed in good faith. In re Knicker-
bocker Hotel Co., 81 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1936).
516 COLLIER 5 6.07.
"Bankruptcy Act § 145, 11 U.S.C. § 545 (1965).
5 Bankruptcy Act § 148, 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1965). See Bankruptcy Act § 113, 11 U.S.C.
513 (1965) (temporary stay prior to approval or dismissal of petition enjoining or staying com-
mencement or continuation of suit against debtor). See also Bankruptcy Act § 116(4), 11 U.S.C.
§ 516(4) (1965) (stay after approval of the petition enjoining or staying commencement or con-
tinuation of suit to enforce a lien). The rights of stayed creditors are protected by Bankruptcy
Act § 261, 11 U.S.C. § 661 (1965), which provides that "all statutes of limitation affecting
claims and interests provable under this chapter and the running of all periods of time prescribed
by this act in respect to the commission of acts of bankruptcy, the recovery of preferences, and
the avoidance of liens and transfers shall be suspended while a proceeding under this chapter is
pending and until it is finally dismissed." See also United States v. Hotel Buckminster, 59 F. Supp.
65 (D. Mass.), aff'd sub nora. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 147 F.2d 761
(1st Cir. 1944) (recording of notice of lien not precluded by § 148). Note that Bankruptcy Act
§ 116(2), 11 U.S.C. 5 516(2) (1965) allows the judge, after the approval of the petition, to
authorize certificates of indebtedness for cash, property, or other consideration with such security
and priority in payment over existing obligations, secured or unsecured, as is equitable.
14 In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 102 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1939). See also In re Common-
wealth Bond Corp., 77 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1935) (stay must relate to main purpose of proceeding
and must contribute to the execution of a plan).
"Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Callaway, 135 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1943); Lincoln
Alliance Bank & Trust Co. v. Dye, 115 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1940); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hen-
wood, 86 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 661 (1937). A creditor may be al-
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IV. CREDITORS-CLAIMS, CLASSIFICATION AND
REPRESENTATION
Following the approval of the petition creditors must file proofs of
claims. Any creditor may object to the allowance of a claim of another
creditor or interest of a stockholder. After filing, the creditors must be
classified according to the nature of their claims for the purposes of treat-
ment in the plan and voting on the plan.
Claims. A creditor is defined as the holder of any claim." A claim is then
defined to include all claims, secured or unsecured, liquidated or unliqui-
dated, fixed or contingent, against a debtor or its property, except stock."
This includes unmatured claims" and tort claims,"9 but the judge, in his
discretion, may discount contingent or unmatured claims. " If discounting
the claims is impossible, then the plan must provide for them." If the
claims can be liquidated, the judge may determine the method to be used,
considering the facts of the case and the interests of the debtor and the
creditor."2
An unliquidated claim may become liquidated during the reorganiza-
tion. The debtor will be bound by an in rem judgment properly rendered
in a suit pending when the reorganization petition was filed. On the other
hand, an in personam judgment will bind the debtor only if the trustee,
receiver, or debtor in possession was a party and directed by the reorgan-
ization court to defend the suit." Where the representative of the debtor
was made a party but at a time when no opportunity to defend on the
merits existed, the judge may refuse to recognize the judgment and may
require the creditor to prove his claim again."
Any person injured by the rejection of an executory contract is also
deemed to be a creditor.6" A claim resulting from an anticipatory breach
prior to the reorganization proceeding is determined and computed ac-
lowed to proceed: (1) if the security involved will not be dealt with in the plan or its withdrawal
will not affect the plan, In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 102 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1939); (2) if
the plan does not provide adequate protection, In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir.
1935); (3) if there seems to be no likelihood that a proper plan can be evolved, Lincoln Alliance
Bank & Trust Co. v. Dye, supra. But see John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Casey, 149 F.2d
484 (1st Cir. 1945) (where judge had under advisement the question of whether to order bank-
ruptcy liquidation or to transfer the proceeding to chapter XI, he committed no abuse of discre-
tion in refusing to vacate the injunction).
"SBankruptcy Act S 106(4), 11 U.S.C. 506(4) (1965).57 
Bankruptcy Act § 106(1), 11 U.S.C. 5 506(1) (1965).
56Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
"°Foust v. Munson S.S. Lines, 299 U.S. 77 (1936).
*Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
'In re Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 106 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 622
(1940).
62 Foust v. Munson S.S. Lines, 299 U.S. 77 (1936) (where liquidation before special master
exposed claimant to serious peril of substantial loss and where a pending state court action would
not hinder, burden, delay or be inconsistent with the chapter X proceeding, an abuse of discretion
may be committed by the judge if he refuses to allow liquidation in the state court proceeding).
See United States v. Peerless Weighing & Vending Mach. Corp., 96 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1938) (plan
may provide for payment being liquidated in a pending proceeding). See also In re International
Ry., 95 F. Supp. 140 (W.D.N.Y. 1949) (where a claim for future cost of work was liquidated by
the reorganization court).
"In re Paramount Publix Corp., 85 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1936).
"See In re James A. Brady Foundry Co., 3 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1924).
'
5 Bankruptcy Act § 202, 11 U.S.C. § 602 (1965). See note 155 infra.
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cording to the law applicable to the contract." If under state law the re-
organization proceedings constitute an anticipatory breach of the contract,
the damages should be computed as of the filing date." If the contract is
rejected under chapter X after surviving the early proceedings, the rejec-
tion is a breach relating back to the filing of the petition for reorganiza-
tion."
The debtor, as lessee, may reject an unexpired lease of real estate. A
claim by the lessor is "limited to an amount not to exceed the rent, with-
out acceleration, reserved by such lease for the three years next succeed-
ing the date of the surrender of the premises to the landlord or the date of
re-entry of the landlord, whichever first occurs, whether before or after
the filing of the petition, plus unpaid accrued rent, without acceleration,
up to such date of surrender or re-entry."'" The date of surrender has
been interpreted as the transition to, and acceptance by, the landlord of
possession.7 A proviso requires scrutiny of "the circumstances of an as-
signment of a future rent claim and the amount of the consideration paid
for such assignment in determining the amount of damages allowed the as-
signee thereof."'"
Interest on a claim occasionally presents a problem. The absolute pri-
ority rule has been held to apply to interest." Prior claimants are there-
fore entitled to interest accrued up to the time of payment of their claims
before inferior claimants are allowed to participate. 8 Post-petition interest
may be allowed: (1) when the debtor is ultimately proven solvent; or (2)
when income is produced during the reorganization by the secured prop-
erty; or (3) when the amount of security meets both the principal and
interest claims." But, no interest is allowed beyond the date of filing the
petition when the mortgaged assets are insufficient to satisfy the principal
debt and the remaining assets are inadequate to meet both the interest de-
ficiency and the unsecured claims with interest. 5
"See Application of Ross Dev. Co., 98 F. Supp. 872 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
7 See Seedman v. Friedman, 132 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1942).
"Bankruptcy Act § 63c, 11 U.S.C. § 103c (1965). The expiration of the time allowed in
a bar order for the filing of claims will not prevent the presentation of a claim based upon the
rejection of an executory contract. In re Greenpoint Metalic Bed Co., 113 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1940).
"Bankruptcy Act § 202, 11 U.S.C. § 602 (1965). The section may not be nullified by the
provisions of particular leases. Oldden v. Tonto Realty Corp., 143 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1944).
"°City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 433, 443 (1937). See also In re
United Cigar Stores Co. of America, 86 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 679
(1937) (premises sublet, date of surrender is when landlord is notified of rejection pursuant to
an order of the court).
7' Bankruptcy Act § 202, 11 U.S.C. § 602 (1965). See In re McCrory Stores Corp., 12 F.
Supp. 267, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
72Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).7 In s'e Deep Rock Oil Corp., 113 F.2d 266 (10th Cir.), cert. denied., 311 U.S. 699 (1940).
Since the accrual of interest is deferred during bankruptcy, it is considered part of the claim when
a reorganization arises out of a pending bankruptcy. In re Oklahoma Ry., 61 F. Supp. 96 (W.D.
Okla. 1945); In re Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 12 F. Supp. 528 (W.D.N.Y. 1935).
4 United States v. Edens, 189 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 342 U.S. 912
(1952). But cf. In re Leeds Homes, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 20 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), aff'd, 332 F.2d
648 (6th Cir. 1964) (post-petition interest denied even though security sufficient to pay both
principal and interest). Note that interest upon interest is not allowed. Vanston Bondholders Pro-
tective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1956).
7Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1943); Ticonic
Nat'l Bank v. Sprague, 303 U.S. 406 (1938).
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Proofs of Claim. Following the approval of the petition, the judge pre-
scribes the manner and time within which proofs of claim may be filed
and allowed." The manner and time for claim presentation are entirely at
the discretion of the judge."
The judge may establish a bar time after which proofs of claim will not
be accepted. The bar order has no application to claims for specific prop-
erty in the possession of the trustee, or the debtor continued in possession
if no trustee is appointed." Furthermore, amendments may be permitted
after the bar time has expired if the proof of claim was filed prior to that
time and the amendment is not in fact the presentation of a new claim."
The judge, of course, has the discretion to extend the time,"0 but judges
have been reluctant to do so, especially where the proceedings are in an
advanced stage."'
The existence vel non of a valid claim is generally determined at the
time of filing the petition under chapter X or, where the reorganization
proceeding develops out of a pending bankruptcy, at the time of
filing of the bankruptcy petition."2 But all valid claims are allowed if
they arise after the reorganization petition has been filed and before either
the qualification of a receiver or trustee or before the petition is approved
and the debtor is continued in possession, whichever occurs first."
Objections. Any creditor may object to the allowance of any claim or
interest. The objection is to be heard and summarily determined by the
court." Typical grounds for objection are that the claim or interest (1)
does not exist;s (2) arose out of an illegal " or fraudulent 7 transaction;
"
8Bankruptcy Act 5 196, 11 U.S.C. § 596 (1965).
77 Fleeger v. Ames, 120 F.2d 803 (10th Cir. 1941). Note that some districts make provision
by local rule.
78Rowan v. Harburney Oil Co., 91 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1937); In re Burgemeister Brewing
Co., 84 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1936).
"'In re Wilshire Professional Bldg., 98 F. Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); In re Kellett Aircraft
Corp., 97 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
"
8Bankruptcy Act 5 119, 11 U.S.C. § 519 (1965).
"
1 North Am. Car Corp. v. Peerless Weighing & Vending Mach. Corp., 143 F.2d 938 (2d Cir.
1944); Standard Steel Works v. American Pipe & Steel Corp., 111 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1940);
In re Corona Radio & Television Corp., 102 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1939). Note that reasonable notice
of the bar time should be given. See New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 293
(1953).
2 In re Paramount Publix Corp., 85 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1936); Planert v. Cosmopolitan Bond
& Mortgage Co., 79 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 657 (1936). Note that
this rule does not apply to claims under Bankruptcy Act §§ 67b (statutory liens), 201, 202, 11
U.S.C. §§ 107b, 601, 602 (1965). Whether a valid and subsisting claim exists is determined by
reference to state law in the absence of overruling federal law. Vanston Bondholders Protective
Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946). See In re V-I-D, Inc., 198 F.2d 392 (7th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 914 (1953) (a claim unenforceable under state law will not be disallowed
where a bankruptcy court orders distribution according to criteria established by the Bankruptcy
Act.).8 Bankruptcy Act S 201, 11 U.S.C. 5 601 (1965). The Act determines the rights, duties, and
liabilities of creditors between the filing of the reorganization petition and the approval of that
petition. Bankruptcy Act § 200, 11 U.S.C. 5 600 (1965). Sections dealing with certain bona fide
transactions in personal property and transfers of real property are incorporated. Bankruptcy Act
§ 70d, 21g, 11 U.S.C. § 11od, 44g (1966). See In re North At. & Gulf S.S. Co., 200 F.
Supp. 818 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nora. Schilling v. McAllister Bros., 310 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1962).
"Bankruptcy Act § 196, 11 U.S.C. § 596 (1965).
'I1n re Philip A. Singer & Bros., 114 F.2d 813 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 649 (1940).
8In re American Fuel & Power Co., 122 F.2d 223 (6th Cir. 1941), appeal dismissed, 322 U.S.
379 (1944); In re Wilton-Maxfield Management C., 117 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1941).8 7 In re Van Sweringen Corp., 111 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1940).
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(3) was the result of an ultra vires act;" (4) lacked consideration; " (5) is
barred by the statute of limitations;" (6) would be a penalty;9' or (7) was
transferred or assigned for inadequate consideration due to fraud, mis-
representation, overreaching or violation of fiduciary duty." Claims of
creditors who have received or acquired preferences, liens, conveyances,
transfers, assignments or encumbrances, void or voidable under the Act,
are not allowed unless the preferences, liens, conveyances, transfers, as-
signments, or encumbrances are surrendered."
If an objection is not supported by evidence, a claim valid on its face
may be allowed. " The party objecting has the burden of going forward
with the evidence, but the burden of proof rests on the claimant." Objec-
tions may be compromised" and claims which have been allowed or re-
jected may be reconsidered.' A creditor's claim may be offset against a
debt provided the court feels that from all of the facts equity requires it.'
The court has summary jurisdiction to determine set-offs."
Classification. Classification of creditors is important because it deter-
mines the treatment under the plan. Since voting is calculated by class,
classification also determines how a creditor's vote will be tabulated. Cred-
itors are divided into classes according to the nature, i.e., the legal char-
acter or effect, of their claims,'" which is usually decided as of the date
of the filing of the reorganization petition."' If the petition is filed in a
'"In re Bankers Trust Co., 15 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Mich. 1936).
"In re 4500 North Hermitage Ave. Apartments Corp., 118 F.2d 857 (7th Cir. 1941).
"In re Madison Rys., 102 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1939).
1In re Tastyeast, Inc., 126 F.2d 879 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 696 (1942) (interest
as penalty). Debts owing to a governmental body as a penalty or forfeiture will only be allowed
up to actual pecuniary loss sustained, together with any "reasonable and actual costs occasioned
thereby and such interest as may have accrued on the amount of such loss according to law."
Bankruptcy Act § 57j, 11 U.S.C. § 93j (1965).
"In re Van Sweringen Co., 119 F.2d 231 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 671 (1941);
In re Norcor Mfg. Co., 109 F.2d 407 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 625 (1940). Note that
the court may either disallow the whole claim, or the interest, or allow it only for the amount
actually paid.
"Bankruptcy Act 5 57g, 11 U.S.C. § 93g (1965).
94Fleeger v. Ames, 120 F.2d 803 (10th Cir. 1941).
"United Hotels Co. of America, Inc. v. Mealey, 147 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1945); Alexander
v. Theleman, 69 F.2d 610 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 581 (1934).
"In re Burns Bros., 14 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
'
T Bankruptcy Act §§ 2(a)(2), 57k, 11 U.S.C. §§ 11(a)(2), 93k (1965).
"United States v. John A. Johnson & Sons, 111 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Tenn. 1953); see Bank-
ruptcy Act § 68, 11 U.S.C. § 108 (1965).
"Susquehanna Chem. Corp. v. Producers Bank & Trust Co., 174 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1949);
In re Cuyahoga Fin. Co., 136 F.2d 18 (6th Cir. 1943) (even though the creditor had not filed
a claim or consented to the court's jurisdiction).
'0Bankruptcy Act § 197, 11 U.S.C. § 597 (1965). This section also provides for notice and
a hearing, if necessary, upon the application of a creditor. Notice is given to holders of secured
claims and others as the judge may designate. The value of the security is determined summarily
and any excess is classified as unsecured. See Mokava Corp. v. Dolan, 147 F.2d 340 (2d Cir.
1945); In re Cosgrove-Meehan Coal Corp., 136 F.2d 3 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 777
(1943); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Champion Shoe Mach. Co., 109 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1940);
In re Ogden Apartment Bldg. Corp., 90 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1937).
"' In re Pittsburgh Rys., 111 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1940), aff'd sub nom. Philadelphia Co. v.
Dipple, 312 U.S. 168 (1941); Butzel v. Webster Apartments Co., 122 F.2d 362 (6th Cir. 1940);
Price v. Spokane Silver & Lead Co., 97 F.2d 237 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 305 U.S. 626 (1938).
Note that this rule does not apply to claims under Bankruptcy Act 55 67b (statutory liens), 201,
202, 11 U.S.C. § 107b, 601, 602 (1965).
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pending bankruptcy, the determining date will be the date of the orig-
inal bankruptcy petition.
10 2
Although the judge exercises a discretionary power in the classification
of creditors,' certain guidelines are well established. The most important
is the absolute priority rule,' ' which requires that full and complete com-
pensation be given a superior class for their surrendered rights before the
next class below may participate."s Since creditors are superior to stock-
holders, they must be separately classified.' " Similarly, secured and unse-
cured creditors must be separately classified since secured creditors are
superior."7 Within these groups the classification will depend upon the
nature of the claim.
Secured creditors are separately classified if their mortgages or liens
differ.'' Of course, where the security transaction is invalid, the creditor
will be classified as unsecured.1" Unsecured creditors are similarly classi-
fied into different groups if their claims are unequal. When certain unse-
cured creditors have some priority or preference over other unsecured cred-
itors, they are separately classified."0
A special priority is given to unsecured claims which arise within six
months of the reorganization and which are deemed operating expenses."'
This priority usually applies against the debtor's current income, but can
be satisfied out of all of the debtor's property if there was either a bene-
fit to the secured creditors or the expenses were a necessity of the busi-
ness."' The six months' rule is usually applied to a public or semi-public
corporation, but there is some indication that the rule also applies to a
private corporation."'
102 Planert v. Cosmopolitan Bond & Mortgage Co., 79 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1935), cert. denied,
296 U.S. 657 (1936).
"'Texas Co. v. Blue Way Lines, Inc., 93 F.2d 593 (Ist Cir. 1937); In re Palisades-on-the
Desplaines, 89 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1937). The federal equity receivership cases will guide the dis-
cretion. In re Sixty-Seven Wall St. Restaurant Corp., 23 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
"04Kyser v. MacAdam, 117 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1941); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Champion
Shoe Mach. Co., 109 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1940).
"' Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1943); Con-
solidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
'..In re Deep Rock Oil Corp., 113 F.2d 266 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 699 (1940).
'"1In re East Boston Coal Co., 30 F. Supp. 811 (M.D. Pa. 1940); In re Utilities Power &
Light Corp., 29 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. Ill. 1939).
'
0 8 Mokava Corp. v. Dolan, 147 F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1945) (first mortgages on different prop-
erty) ; Kyser v. MacAdam, 117 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1941) (mortgage and mechanic's lien). Pur-
chase money mortgages on different parcels of land in the same locality and project may be classi-
fied together, notwithstanding variations in the value of property, the amounts and maturity dates
of the mortgages, and other similar factors. In re Palisades-on-the-Desplaines, 89 F.2d 214, 217
(7th Cir. 1937).
"0'United States Hoffman Mach. Corp. v. Lauchli, 150 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1945); Nash v.
Onondaga Hotel Corp., 140 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1944).
""See In re Cosgrove-Meehan Coal Corp., 136 F.2d 3 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 777
(1943) (a claim for services performed in saving some of the debtor's property is entitled to pri-
ority in the fund produced).
als In re North Atl. & Gulf S.S. Co., 200 F. Supp. 818 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub norn. Schilling
v. McAllister Bros., 310 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1962).
". Id. Some circumstances might call for a longer time. See Southern Ry. v. Carnegie Steel
Co., 176 U.S. 257 (1900); In re Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 90 F.2d 312 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
302 U.S. 717 (1937).
..a Dudley v. Mealey, 147 F.2d 268 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 873 (1945). But cf. In
re Pussey & Jones Corp., 295 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1961); lit re North Atl. & Gulf S.S. Co., 200
F. Supp. 818 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom. Schilling v. McAllister Bros., 310 F.2d 123 (2d Cir.
1962).
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Subordination agreements among creditors are given effect in determin-
ing classification,"" and equity may sometimes require the subordination of
other claims. Usually, equitable subordination is imposed in cases of il-
legality," ' fraud,1 ' unjust enrichment or breach of a fiduciary relation-
ship," ' and transactions between an officer and the company or between
a parent and a subsidiary corporation.
Where creditors have distinct voting interests, because of some dual
status such as creditor and stockholder, they may be separately classified." '
On the other hand, mere bias or leaning in voting interests does not pro-
vide a sufficient foundation for classification."' Classification is subject to
a later modification."' For example, a change in the proposed treatment of
claims that were originally classed together requires separate classifica-
tion."
Representation. Any creditor has the right to be heard on all matters
arising in a proceeding under chapter X"' and a similar right to appeal."
4
2
This right also extends to a representative of the creditor-an attorney, or
duly authorized agent or committee."
A representative may perform any act under chapter X,12' but a power
of attorney is necessary to define the scope of an agent's or committee's
authority."' The representative is a fiduciary,"' and conflicts of interests or
disloyalty will not be tolerated."' The judge has the power to supervise
""Elias v. Clarke, 143 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 778 (1944); In re Allied
Properties Co., 118 F.2d 773 (6th Cir. 1941); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Champion Shoe Mach.
Co., 109 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1940).
". In re Inland Gas Corp., 187 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1951); Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
United States, 151 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1945), 153 F.2d 101 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
737 (1946). But cf. West 52nd Theatre Co. v. Tyler, 178 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1949).
". See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
'"In re Commonwealth Light & Power Co., 141 F.2d 734 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S.
766 (1944); President & Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Kelby, 147 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 324 U.S. 866 (1945).
".In re V. Loewer's Gambrinus Brewery Co., 167 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1948); In re Kansas City
Journal-Post Co., 144 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1944).
".Kaufman County Levee Improvement Dist. No. 4 v. Mitchell, 116 F.2d 959 (5th Cir.
1941).
"2 'J. P. Morgan & Co. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 85 F.2d 351 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S.
604 (1936).
121 Id.
". Kyser v. MacAdam, 117 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1941).
"'Bankruptcy Act § 206, 11 U.S.C. § 606 (1965). Creditors may petition the judge for an
order designating them as recipients of notice. In re International Power Secs. Corp., 38 F. Supp.
543 (D.N.J. 1941); In re 8309 Talbot Place Corp., 27 F. Supp. 40 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
124 Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204 (1945).
I'Bankruptcy Act 5 209, 11 U.S.C. § 609 (1965). See Bankruptcy Act §§ 163-66, 11 U.S.C.
55 563-66 (1965) for the preparation and availability of lists. An attorney must file a statement
with the court listing the names and addresses of the creditors he represents, the nature and amount
of their claims, and the time of acquisition, excepting claims alleged to have been acquired more
than one year prior to the filing of the petition. Bankruptcy Act § 210, 11 U.S.C. § 610 (1965).
Every representative, person or committee, of more than twelve creditors must file under oath
a statement including certain essential ingredients as specified in the Act. Bankruptcy Act § 211,
11 U.S.C. § 611 (1965).
126Manufacturers' Trust Co. v. Kelby, 125 F.2d 650 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 697
(1942).
"'In re Pilsener Brewing Co., 79 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1935).
"' Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178 (1944); Woods v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S.
26212(1941).19Woods v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262 (1941); American United Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138 (1940).
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those acting in a representative capacity, and he may (1) disregard any
provision of the authorization agreement, (2) demand an accounting,
(3) restrain the exercise of any power which he finds to be unfair or not
consistent with public policy, and (4) limit any claim or stock acquired
by the representative in contemplation or in the course of the reorganiza-
tion to the actual consideration paid.' Further, the representative will not
be allowed to appear in the chapter X proceeding until he has satisfied
the court that he has complied with all applicable state and federal laws
regulating his activities and personnel.'31
V. PROCEEDINGS SUBSEQUENT TO APPROVAL OF PETITION
After the approval of the petition and before any plan for reorganiza-
tion is submitted, the court must provide for the management of the
debtor corporation. Where the indebtedness of the debtor, liquidated as to
amount and not contingent as to liability, is $250,000 or over, the judge
must appoint a trustee upon approval of the petition."3 ' If the indebtedness
is less than $250,000, the judge has a choice between appointing a trustee
or allowing the debtor to continue in possession." In any event, since a
debtor in possession holds its powers in trust for the creditors, the creditors
have the right to require the exercise of those powers for their benefit.134
Where a trustee is appointed, the judge may appoint as an additional
trustee a person who is a director, officer, or employee of the debtor to
operate the business and manage the property of the debtor."n A trustee
must be a disinterested individual who is competent to perform his duties,
or a corporation authorized by its charter or by-laws to act as a trustee."'
The Act disqualifies a person from acting as a trustee if:.'
(1) he is a creditor or stockholder of the debtor;"' or
(2) he is or was an underwriter of any of the outstanding securities of the
debtor or within five years prior to the date of the filing of the petition was
underwriter of any securities of the debtor; or
(3) he is, or was within two years prior to the date of the filing of the peti-
tion, a director, officer, or employee of the debtor or any such underwriter,
13OBankruptcy Act § 212, 11 U.S.C. § 612 (1965). See, e.g., In re Castle Beach Apartments,
Inc., 113 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1940) (judge may prohibit vote of representative).
"a Bankruptcy Act § 213, 11 U.S.C. § 613 (1965). See S. REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. 34 (1938). See also 6A COLLIER 5 9.32 for a discussion of the effect of the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
132Bankruptcy Act § 156, 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1965).
1331d. See also Bankruptcy Act § 159, 11 U.S.C. § 559 (1965) (where the indebtedness is less
than $250,000, the judge may at any time terminate the appointment of a trustee and restore
the debtor to the possession of its property, or, if the debtor has been continued in possession,
terminate its possession and appoint a trustee).
1a41n re Martin Custom Made Tires Corp., 108 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1939).
"aSBankruptcy Act § 156, 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1965). See also Bankruptcy Act § 160, 11
U.S.C. § 560 (1965): "In any case, the judge at any time, without or upon cause shown may
appoint additional trustees and co-trustees, or remove trustee and appoint substitute trustees; and
upon each such appointment the judge shall fix a hearing . . . to consider objections to the
retention in office of the trustee ....
"'Bankruptcy Act § 45, 11 U.S.C. § 73 (1965). Note that under chapter X the trustee
need not reside or have his office within the district.
1S7Bankruptcy Act § 158, 11 U.S.C. § 558 (1965).
13"See In re Realty Associates Sec. Corp., 56 F. Supp. 1007 (E.D.N.Y. 1944) (nominal owner-
ship of the subsidiary's stock in their fiduciary capacity as trustees of the parent does not prevent
such persons from being deemed disinterested).
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or an attorney for the debtor of such underwriter;... or
(4) it appears that he has, by reason of any other direct or indirect rela-
tionship to, connection with, or interest in the debtor or such underwriter,
or for any reason an interest materially adverse to the interests of any class
of creditors or stockholders.
These tests are not exclusive but they do cover most conflicts which
could arise. The purpose of the requirement of disinterestedness is to in-
sure that a trustee will be independent of all conflicting interests which
might color his decisions concerning estate matters. An attorney appointed
to represent a trustee must also be disinterested.' However, an exception
is made if an attorney is employed for a specified purpose other than rep-
resenting the trustee in conducting the chapter X proceeding, such as a
managerial function."1
At the first required hearing or any adjournment thereof, or, upon ap-
plication, at any other time, the creditors may object to the continuance
of the debtor in possession or the appointment of a trustee upon the
ground that he is not qualified or not disinterested.'' In order to success-
fully attack the judge's order the creditor must show an abuse of dis-
cretion on the part of the judge.14"
If a trustee has been appointed, he has the ultimate responsibility for
the preparation of a reorganization plan. The trustee is under a duty to
furnish all creditors with a brief statement concerning the property, liabil-
ities, and financial condition of the debtor, the operation of its business
and the desirability of its continuance.'" This information enables the
creditors to make informed suggestions for the formulation of a plan.' If
a debtor is continued in possession, the judge may at any time appoint a
disinterested person as an examiner to prepare a plan.' If the creditors be-
.. See In re TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., 334 F.2d 118, 119-20 (5th Cir. 1964) ("A trustee
would not be disinterested . . . if the proponents of a plan assured him of emoluments and
security rather than merely nominating him for approval by the court and subject to the usual
control of the Board of Directors."). Note that the provision permitting the appointment of an
additional trustee who is a director, officer, or employee of the debtor must be made to harmonize
with section 158(3) of the Act, and that portion of the latter prohibiting the appointment of
such a person must be held inapplicable. Meredith v. Thralls, 144 F.2d 473 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 758 (1944). However, an additional trustee must meet the other requirements of dis-
interestedness. In re Ocean City Auto. Bridge Co., 184 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1950) (he cannot be
a stockholder or have acted as counsel for various stockholders and creditors of the corporation).
14'Bankruptcy Act 5 157, 11 U.S.C. 5 557 (1965). See In re Progress Lectro Shave Corp.,
117 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1941); In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 93 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1937)
(where an attorney's firm has represented, for the year immediately preceding, an important
creditor and majority stockholder of the debtor corporation, even though the matters in which
such attorney was employed had no relation to the debtor's reorganization, that firm of attorneys
should not be retained as counsel by the trustee).
'4'Bankruptcy Act § 157, 11 U.S.C. § 557 (1965). See In re McGrath Mfg. Co., 95 F. Supp.
825 (D. Neb. 1951) (employment of an attorney for the handling of business matters such as the
leasing of property and the collection of accounts, though the attorney was not disinterested).
"4Bankruptcy Act § 162, 11 U.S.C. § 562 (1965).
1" This may be done by showing an improper appointment, i.e., one harmful to the interest
of creditors or the administration of the estate. See, e.g., In re Hotel Martin Co., 83 F.2d 233
(2d Cir. 1936) (where a bank controlled the election of directors, and the appointment of the
debtor to continue in possession would mean that the interests of the bank as mortgagee would
be paramount and the other creditors and stockholders would have little to say about manage-
ment, the judge did not abuse his discretion in appointing a trustee).
144Bankruptcy Act 5 167(5), 11 U.S.C. § 567(5) (1965).
...See Bankruptcy Act § 167(6), 11 U.S.C. § 567(6) (1965).
"Bankruptcy Act S 168, 11 U.S.C. § 568 (1965).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
lieve that an investigation is warranted to determine whether the debtor
corporation has claims against management or other persons, or that claims
exist which the debtor is not satisfactorily pursuing, they may seek an
examination of the facts or petition the judge for the appointment of an
examiner." '
Where a trustee has been appointed, he must either submit a plan or a
report of the reasons why a plan cannot be effected.14 A hearing is then
held and the creditors may object to the plan or report, make amendments,
or propose other plans. Where the debtor is continued in possession, each
creditor may file one or more plans, and a hearing is provided to consider
objections and amendments."'
VI. PROVISIONS OF A PLAN
Chapter X requires the inclusion of certain provisions in any plan and
permits the inclusion of others.' The plan must alter or modify the rights
of at least one class of creditors either by issuance of new securities or
otherwise."' However, a plan which merely provides for the new corpora-
tion to pay the debts in full as they mature has been interpreted as a change
of creditor's rights within the statute."' A secured creditor's rights are
modified within the meaning of the Act if the date for full payment of the
principal is extended or if a reduced amount in cash is accepted in full
payment of the debt."'
The plan may deal with all or any part of the debtor's property. 4 and
may provide for the rejection of most executory contracts."' The plan must
provide for the payment of all costs and expenses of administration and
other allowances which may be made or approved by the judge;" ' must
specify what claims, if any, are to be fully paid in cash" ' and the credi-
tors or any class of them not affected by the plan and the provisions, if
'4' Gochenour v. Cleveland Terminals Bldg. Co., 118 F.2d 89 (6th Cir. 1941); see Bankruptcy
Act § 21(a), 11 U.S.C. § 44(a) (1965) (concerning examinations).
4' Bankruptcy Act 5 169, 11 U.S.C. 5 569 (1965).
4
'Bankruptcy Act § 170, 11 U.S.C. § 570 (1965). See Bankruptcy Act § 171, 11 U.S.C.
5 571 (1965) for the provision concerning notice under § 169, 170. Note that the judge may
advance the time of the hearing upon the application of any creditor.
"'.Bankruptcy Act 5 216, 11 U.S.C. § 616 (1965).
"'.Bankruptcy Act § 216(1), 11 U.S.C. § 616(1) (1965).
"'. Continental Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Oil Ref. Corp., 89 F.2d 333 (5tb Cir. 1937), cert. denied,
305 U.S. 622 (1938).
"S3 In re Janson Steel & Iron Co., 47 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
'Bankruptcy Act § 216(2), 11 U.S.C. § 616(2) (1965).
"
5 Bankruptcy Act 5 216(4), 11 U.S.C. § 616(4) (1965). Contracts in the public authority
may not be rejected. The term "in the public authority" is not defined in the Act nor by the
courts. The Congressional purpose was to prevent the cancellation of contracts with public agen-
cies or bodies where the public interest would be affected. Hearings on H.R. 8046 Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. 171-99 (1937-1938). If a contract has not
already been dealt with, a party to the contract may insist that it either be rejected or fully as-
sumed, but mere failure to reject does not amount to an assumption; and where a plan neither
rejects nor assumes an executory contract, but nevertheless assigns it to a new corporation, the
party to the contract, without protesting, will be bound by confirmation of the plan. Mohonk
Realty Corp. v. Wise Shoe Stores, Inc., 111 F.2d 287 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 654 (1940).
A plan cannot modify the terms of a leasehold estate belonging to a debtor. In re Michigan-Ohio
Bldg. Corp., 97 F.2d 845 (7th Cir. 1938). The proper procedure is to provide for a modification
of the leasehold by a plan with provisions for rejection if the modification is not accepted by
the lessor. Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1943).
"'Bankruptcy Act 5 216(3), 11 U.S.C. 5 616(3) (1965).
'"Bankruptcy Act § 216(5), 11 U.S.C. § 616(5) (1965).
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any, made for them;.. must include in the charter of the debtor, or any
corporation organized to carry out the plan, those provisions for the pro-
tection of the creditors which are enumerated in the Act;"9 and must
provide adequate means for the execution of the plan.'
Any class of creditors which is affected by the plan and does not accept
it by the required two-thirds majority must be provided with adequate
protection for the realization of their claims against the property. " ' There-
fore, the dissenting classes must receive complete compensation or the "in-
'"Bankruptcy Act 5 216(6), 11 U.S.C. § 616(6) (1965). See Principale v. General Pub.
Util. Corp., 164 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1947) (court has power to exclude non-original holders of
securities).
'"Bankruptcy Act § 216(12), 11 U.S.C. 5 616(12) (1965).
'"0Bankruptcy Act § 216(10), 11 U.S.C. § 616(10) (1965). Note that the Act lists a num-
ber of methods which might be used. Whatever means are chosen must conform with applicable
state and federal laws. In re Ambassador Hotel Corp., 124 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1942); In re Elless
Co., 84 F. Supp. 280 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd and modified on other grounds, 174 F.2d 925 (6th Cir.
1949) (corporation laws of state or incorporation will control); see Baker Share Corp. v. London
Terrace, Inc., 130 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1942) (powers and voting trusts); Brockett v. Winkle
Terra Cotta Co., 81 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1936) (issuance of stock). See also Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 12-27, 44 (1963); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa-77bbbb (1963);
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1963). Note Bankruptcy Act § 264, 11 U.S.C.
5 664 (1965) which provides that § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 does not apply to certain
transactions under chapter X; Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. 55
79-79z-6 (1963). See also In re 333 North Mich. Ave. Bldg. Corp., 84 F.2d 936 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 299 U.S. 602 (1936) (plan may authorize the organization of a new corporation
under the laws of the state where the objects of the plan can be more advantageously carried
out, rather than the state where the debtor's property is located).
... Bankruptcy Act § 216(7), 11 U.S.C. § 616(7) (1965). The dissenting class must be pro-
tected by one of the following methods:
(a) The transfer, sale, or retention by the debtor, of the property subject to such claims.
Where a nonassenting class of secured creditors have security exceeding the value of their claims,
this provision may afford a successful means of treatment. See, e.g., Texas Hotel Secs. Corp. v.
Waco Dev. Co., 87 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 679 (1937). Where the
value of the security is less than the claims, adequate protection may be afforded if the creditors
are allowed to come in as unsecured creditors for any excess of the amount of their claims over
the value of the security. In re Englander Spring Bed Co., 86 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1936).
(b) By a sale of such property free of such claims, at not less than a fair upset price, and
the transfer of such claims to the proceeds of such sale. Upset price is merely a minimum price
below which the court will not permit the property to be sold. See Country Life Apartments,
Inc. v. Buckley, 145 F.2d 935, 938 (2d Cir. 1944) (adequate protection where upset price was
fair market value; "[n]or does it make any difference that no actual bid was forthcoming at the
auction sale. The trustee's plan gave the nonassenting creditors the opportunity the Bankruptcy
Act requires. The fact that they either did not wish to or could not take advantage of this
opportunity is immaterial.")
(c) By appraisal and payment in cash of the values of such claims. See, e.g., National City
Bank v. O'Connell, 155 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1946) (payment in full). The appraisal provision
may not be used to secure value for the benefit of junior interests. See Preble Corp. v. Wentworth,
84 F.2d 73 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 575 (1936) (where mortgage bondholders refused
to consent to a reorganization plan and the value of the property was substantially less than the
debt, the debtor's property could not be taken from the bondholders by an appraisal of their
securities).
(d) By such method as will, under and consistent with the circumstances of the particular
case, equitably and fairly provide such protection. For a case where this subsection was regarded
as an alternative ground, see National City Bank v. O'Connell, 155 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1946).
Where the value of the property is such that it is insufficient to satisfy the claims of all or
some of the junior creditors, their claims over and above the value of the property are worthless
and the plan may disregard them since there is no need for adequate protection where there is no
interest or equity to be protected, i.e., they are not affected by the plan. Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939); In re 620 Church St. Bldg. Corp., 299 U.S. 24 (1936).
For plans providing inadequate protection, see Horn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 88 F.2d
64 (9th Cir. 1937); Oakland Hotel Co. v. Crocker First Nat'l Bank, 85 F.2d 959 (9th Cir.
1936); Brockett v. Winkle Terra Cotta Co., 81 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1936). For plans providing
adequate protection, see In re Chelsea Hotel Corp., 246 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1957); Country Life
Apartments, Inc. v. Buckley, 145 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1944); In re Georgian Hotel Corp., 82 F.2d
917 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 673 (1936).
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dubitable equivalence" of their surrendered rights.'
If the plan creates or extends any indebtedness for a period of more
than five years, provisions may be made for the retirement of such in-
debtedness by stated or determinable payments out of a sinking fund or
otherwise."3 If the indebtedness is secured, the retirement provided must
be within the expected useful life of the security. If the indebtedness is un-
secured, or if the expected useful life of the security is not fairly ascer-
tainable, then the retirement must be within a reasonable time, which
must be specified and not in excess of forty years.
With respect to the manner of selection of the directors, officers, or
voting trustees of the reorganized corporation, if any, the plan must in-
clude provisions which are equitable, compatible with the interests of
creditors, and consistent with public policy.' This has been interpreted to
require an allocation of voting power that will recognize the respective
rights of the various classes of creditors. 6'
The plan may provide for the settlement or adjustment of claims be-
longing to the debtor or to the estate."' If such claims are not settled or
162 In re Herwcg, 119 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1941); Kyser v. MacAdam, 117 F.2d 232 (2d Cir.
1941); White v. Penelas Mining Co., 105 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1939); Texas Hotel Secs. Corp. v.
Waco Dev. Co., 87 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 679 (1937) (inadequate
protection given by scaling down past and future mortgage interest and extending maturity of
principal seven years when the debtor is solvent); In re Granville & Winthrop Bldg. Corp., 87
F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 702 (1937) (inadequate protection given by
providing for a liquidating trust of fifteen years for bond holders with certificates of interest
representing no interest in the property but only an interest in the net income and proceeds of
property to be operated by liquidating trustees); Francisco Bldg. Corp. v. Battson, 83 F.2d 93
(9th Cir. 1936) (inadequate protection provided by substituting $340,000 five per cent income
bonds for $524,000 six per cent first-mortgage bonds).
..
3 Bankruptcy Act § 216(9), 11 U.S.C. 5 616(9) (1965). See In re Quaker City Cold Stor-
age Co., 71 F. Supp. 124 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (whether the proposed plan for reorganization of
debtor should be amended by increasing the annual sinking fund payment in order to reduce a
new first mortgage was optional and the court would not impose its personal preference, in absence
of contention that fund was dangerously low); In re Gibson Hotels, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 859
(S.D.W. Va. 1938) (where plan provides that all earnings of the debtor's property must be ap-
plied to necessary expenses of operation, or retirement of bond indebtedness, or to be turned over
to the mortgage trustees to become subject to their liens and to be used only upon the conditions
and for the purposes stated in the plan, there is no unfairness in failing to make an affirmative
provision for a sinking fund).
'"Bankruptcy Act § 216(11), 11 U.S.C. § 616(11) (1965); see In re Boston Metropolitan
Bldgs., Inc., 92 F. Supp. 843 (D. Mass. 1950) (plan was amended to provide for approval by the
court of the initial board of directors and officers of the new corporation); In re Lower Broad-
way Properties, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (voting trust upheld); In re Mortgage
Guarantee Co., 36 F. Supp. 988 (D. Md. 1941) (voting trust approved); In re Reo Motor Car
Co., 30 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Mich. 1939) (plan providing that during period of a loan the cor-
poration would be managed by a board of directors elected by voting trustees to be named by
the court).
... In re Indiana Cent. Tel. Co., 24 F. Supp. 342 (D. Del. 1938) (where the parent of a sub-
sidiary in reorganization owned all of the stock of the subsidiary and sixty-seven per cent of its
bonds, plan enabled it to elect a majority of the first board of directors). See also In re Hudson
& Manhattan R.R., 174 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd sub nom. Spitzer v. Stichman, 278
F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1960) (plan required trustee to submit amendment providing that initial
directors of corporation be selected by the court from among nominees to be submitted by bond-
holders); In re Prudence Bonds Corp., 16 F. Supp. 324 (E.D.N.Y. 1935) (when the new board
has members selected by bondholders, it may be necessary to give the majority of the bondholders'
representatives the right to veto decisions where there is a conflict of interest between bondholders
and stockholders).
... Bankruptcy Act § 216(13), 11 U.S.C. § 616(13) (1965). For plans where large claims
by creditors and conflicting claims arising out of manipulation were compromised, see In re Asso-
ciated Gas & Elec. Co., 61 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Il. 1944), aff'd, 149 F.2d 996 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 736 (1945); In re McCrory Stores Corp., 14 F. Supp. 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
See also Coral Gables First Nat'l Bank v. Constructors of Florida, Inc., 299 F.2d 736 (5th Cir.
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adjusted in the plan, then a provision must be made for their retention
and enforcement by the trustee or by an examiner if the debtor has been
continued in possession.'67 The plan may also include any other appropriate
provisions not inconsistent with the provisions of chapter X.' s
After a hearing on the proposed plan or plans, 6' the district judge must
approve the plan or plans which in his opinion have the necessary provi-
sions and which are fair and equitable, and feasible. "' The judge then sets
a time within which the creditors and stockholders affected by the plan
may accept it, 17' and the plan is distributedY.1
7
VII. ACCEPTANCE, CONFIRMATION AND CONSUMMATION OF PLAN
After the judge approves the plan, the creditors are given an opportun-
ity to accept or reject it. Following an affirmative vote by the requisite
number of creditors and stockholders, the plan must be confirmed by the
judge before it may go into effect.
Acceptance. The plan must be accepted in writing by the creditors hold-
ing two-thirds in amount of the allowed claims in each class. Claims of
creditors not affected by the plan, or those whose acceptance or failure to
accept is in bad faith, or those who do not accept and are provided for in
the plan are excluded in determining the size of each class. "'
Only those creditors whose interests are materially and adversely af-
fected by the plan are allowed to vote. ' 4 A creditor whose claim is worth-
less because the property of the debtor cannot meet the claims of senior
lien holders has no interest that can be materially or adversely affected.
17
Similarly, a creditor who is to be paid in full with cash 17 or a secured cred-
itor who retains a lien on the debtor's property which is adequate to meet
his claim' 7 is not materially and adversely affected by the plan.
If the plan is accepted by the requisite majority, those voting against
the acceptance will be bound by it even though their interests are material-
1962) (plan provided for continuation of litigation in state court between the debtor and a mort-
gagee).
1
6 7lBankruptcy Act § 216(13), 11 U.S.C. § 616(13) (1965). See In re Universal Lubricating
Systems, Inc., 150 F.2d 832 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 744 (1945).
6
'Bankruptcy Act § 216(14), 11 U.S.C. § 616(14) (1965).
'Bankruptcy Act 55 169, 170, 11 U.S.C. § 569, 570 (1965). Note that if a plan has been
submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to 5 172 the judge cannot approve
the plan until a report has been filed, or the judge has been notified that no report will be filed,
or a reasonable time has expired for the filing of a report as fixed by the judge. Bankruptcy Act
§§ 172-74, 11 U.S.C. § 572-74 (1965).
17°Bankruptcy Act § 174, 11 U.S.C. § 574 (1965).
17' Id.
'72 Bankruptcy Act § 175, 11 U.S.C. § 575 (1965) provides for material to be sent with the
plan in order to facilitate informed voting. Bankruptcy Act § 176, 11 U.S.C. 5 576 (1965)
prohibits the solicitation of any acceptance or authority to accept before the entry of an order
approving a plan and the transmittal thereof to the creditors and stockholders. Any such solicita-
tion is invalid unless the consent of the court has been obtained.
"73Bankruptcy Act § 179, 11 U.S.C. § 579 (1965).
1 "See Bankruptcy Act § 107, 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1965).
"'In re 620 Church St. Bldg. Corp., 299 U.S. 24 (1936); In re V-I-D, Inc., 226 F.2d 113
(7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 968 (1956). See also In re Frank Fehr Brewing Co., 268
F.2d 170 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 963 (1960).
'
7 See Country Life Apartments, Inc. v. Buckley, 145 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1944).
"1 Gross v. Bush Terminal Co., 105 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1939); Central States Life Ins. Co.
v. Koplar Co., 85 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1936).
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ly changed. 7 ' Since a creditor may be represented by an attorney at law or
a duly authorized agent or committee,7 ' valid acceptances may be filed
by the representative."' A committee must be given authority, by a proxy
or by power of attorney or by having the securities deposited under an
agreement authorizing the acceptance of the plan."' The judge has the
authority to disqualify a claim for the purpose of determining the requisite
majority for the acceptance of the plan if the acceptance or failure to ac-
cept is not in good faith."' This provision "was intended to apply to those
. whose selfish purpose was to obstruct a fair and feasible reorganization
in the hope that someone would pay them more than the ratable equiva-
lent of their proportionate part of the bankrupt's assets."'' . Of course, this
type of behavior must be distinguished from the selfish reasons used in
determining what is best for oneself. The latter does not necessarily amount
to bad faith."4 A purchase of a claim in order to secure approval or rejec-
tion of the plan is not in itself bad faith."' But the purchase and the price
paid are factors to be considered in determining good faith."'
Even though the Act makes no provision concerning who may object to
a vote, it does give creditors and others the right to be heard on all mat-
ters."' In addition, the courts have recognized objections by junior credi-
tors or lien holders even though they have no equity in the debtor's prop-
erty."' There can be no withdrawal of an acceptance without judicial ap-
proval upon the showing of a substantial reason."'
The Act provides for the alteration of a plan after its submission for
acceptance."' The judge must approve all changes, and his decision is final
'.' In re Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 106 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 622
(1940); In re Michigan-Ohio Bldg. Corp., 97 F.2d 845 (7th Cir. 1938); Ogilvie v. Dexter Horton
Estate, 86 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 615 (1937); Campbell v. Alleghany
Corp., 75 F.2d 947 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 581 (1935). Note that a creditor need not
file a rejection if he does not wish to approve a plan. In re Kenilworth Bldg. Corp., 105 F.2d 673
(7th Cir. 1939).
"'0Bankruptcy Act S 209, 11 U.S.C. § 609 (1965).
'" In re Pilsener Brewing Co., 79 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1935) (agent); In re Pressed Steel Car
Co., 16 F. Supp. 329 (W.D. Pa. 1936) (broker).
l8tStandard Gas & Elec. Co. v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 117 F.2d 615 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
313 U.S. 564 (1941); In re Witherbee Court Corp., 88 F.2d 251 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301
U.S. 701 (1937); In re Wabash-Harrison Bldg. Corp., 85 F.2d 395 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 298
U.S. 685 (1936); Penn-Florida Hotels Corp. v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 84 F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1936).
"' Bankruptcy Act S 203, 11 U.S.C. § 603 (1965). A hearing upon notice is required.
"'Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 211 (1945). See American United Life Ins. Co. v.
City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138 (1940) (bad faith where individual will obtain an undisclosed
benefit); In re Fuller Cleaning & Dyeing Co., 118 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1941) (bad faith where
bondholders agreed to vote in favor of plan as part of an agreement for the purchase of their
interests); In re Pine Hill Collieries Co., 46 F. Supp. 669, 671 (E.D. Pa. 1942) ("(p]ure malice,
'strikes' and blackmail, and the purpose to destroy an enterprise in order to advance the interests
of a competing business, all plainly . . . [constitute] bad faith .... ").
"84 Teton, Reorganization Revised, 48 YAIE L.J. 573, 601, 602 (1939).
"In re P-R Holding Corp., 147 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1945); Mokova Corp. v. Dolan, 147 F.2d
340 (2d Cir. 1945).
1 "American United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138 (1940).
"'7Bankruptcy Act §§ 206-07, 11 U.S.C. §§ 606-07 (1965).
1'8In re Witherbee Court Corp., 88 F.2d 251 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 701 (1937).
'"In re Frank Fehr Brewing Co., 268 F.2d 170 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 963
(1960); Continental Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Oil Ref. Corp., 89 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1937), cert.
denied, 305 U.S. 622 (1938); In re Eldredge Brewing Co., 26 F. Supp. 920 (D.N.H. 1939) (rea-
sons unsubstantial); In re Clark & Willow Sts. Corp., 21 F. Supp. 43 (E.D.N.Y. 1937); In re
Pressed Steel Car Co., 16 F. Supp. 329 (W.D. Pa. 1936).
19"Bankruptcy Act § 222, 11 U.S.C. § 622 (1965).
COMMENT
unless there is an abuse of discretion. 1' If, in the judge's opinion, the
change would not materially and adversely affect the creditors' interests, it
need not be voted on.' If the judge finds that the proposed change would
materially and adversely affect the creditors' interests, a hearing must be
had and a time must be set for the acceptance or rejection of the change. 9'
Confirmation. The Act provides for a hearing to consider confirmation
of the plan after the creditors have voted for acceptance. ' The order of
the judge approving a plan does not affect the right of a creditor to object
to the confirmation of the plan.'9'
In order to confirm the plan, the judge must be satisfied that (1) all
proceedings subsequent to the approval of the petition, all necessary pro-
visions for obligations owing to the United States, 9 ' and all provisions re-
quired to be in the plan have been complied with; (2) that the plan is fair
and equitable, and feasible; (3) that good faith exists in the proposal and
acceptance of the plan and no forbidden promises or means were used;
197
(4) that all payments made or promised for services, costs and expenses
have been fully disclosed to the judge and are reasonable, or, if to be fixed
later, will be subject to the approval of the judge; 99 and (5) that the
identity, qualifications, and affiliations of the directors or officers, or voting
trustees, if any, have been fully disclosed, and their appointment is equi-
table, compatible with the interests of creditors and consistent with pub-
lic policy. 9
Fair and Equitable and Feasible. The requirement that the plan be fair
and equitable and feasible provides substantial protection for the creditors'
interests. These requirements must be found at both the approval and the
confirmation of the plan. The fair and equitable standard refers to the dis-
tribution under the plan, whereas the feasible standard refers to the eco-
nomic soundness of the plan.
Valuation of the debtor's property is an important step in determining
both the fairness of the distribution and the economic feasibility of the
9' In re 1934 Realty Corp., 150 F.2d 477 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); In
re Diversey Bldg. Corp., 141 F.2d 65 (7th Cir. 1944); Rogers v. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co.,
114 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1940) (proposed modification not timely under circumstances of case).
".. In re P-R Holding Corp., 147 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1945).
".. If a creditor who has previously accepted the plan does not file a written rejection of the
proposed change within the time fixed by the judge, he is deemed to have accepted the change
unless his previous acceptance provides otherwise. Bankruptcy Act § 223, 11 U.S.C. § 623 (1965).
14 Bankruptcy Act § 179, 11 U.S.C. § 579 (1965).
"'Bankruptcy Act 5 180, 11 U.S.C. § 580 (1965).
'
95 See Bankruptcy Act § 199, 11 U.S.C. § 599 (1965).
... The proposal may be in bad faith if the plan is so visionary or impractical that it would
be impossible to accomplish. See Price v. Spokane Silver & Lead Co., 97 F.2d 237 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 305 U.S. 626 (1938); In re Tennessee Publishing Co., 81 F.2d 463 (6th Cir.), aff'd,
299 U.S. 18 (1936). One writer has said that the second part of the subsection, dealing with the
means or promises forbidden by the Act, refers to §§ 152, 153, and 154 of title 18 of the United
States Code, the criminal provisions dealing with bankruptcy. 6A COLLIER 5 11.08.
... This subsection was enacted to eliminate private agreements fixing compensation or reim-
bursement. Leiman v. Guttman, 336 U.S. 1 (1949). Criminal penalties are levied on such agree-
ments. 18 U.S.C. § 155 (1965).
"'Bankruptcy Act 5 221, 11 U.S.C. § 621 (1965). For an example of judicial approval of a
plan, see In re Waltham Watch Co., 97 F. Supp. 189 (D. Mass.), aff'd sub non. Horowitz v.
Kaplan, 193 F.2d 64 (1st Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 946 (1952).
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plan. The capital structure of the reorganized company must not only re-
spect the priorities of the claimants but also should provide a reasonable
prospect for survival."° The debtor must, therefore, be evaluated as a going
concern via the capitalization of prospective earnings."° The nature and
condition of the properties, the past earnings record, and all circumstances
which indicate whether or not that record is a reliable criterion of future
performance should be considered. 2 A liquidation value might be appli-
cable if all or part of the debtor's property is non-productive, °3 or if the
liquidation value is higher than the going concern value."4 Where the plan
provides for eventual liquidation, liquidating values should be used.2 1' The
judge's findings on value, being findings of fact, will not be reversed unless
clearly erroneous.'
The requirement that the plan be fair and equitable also demands that
the absolute priority rule be followed." The plan must provide for par-
ticipation of claims and interests in complete recognition of their strict
priorities, and the debtor's property must support the extent of participa-
tion afforded each class of claims or interests.0 The United States Supreme
Court has said:
[I]t is necessary to fit each into the hierarchy of the new capital structure
in such a way that each will retain in relation to the other the same position
it formerly had in respect of assets and of earnings of various levels. If that
is done, each has obtained new securities which are the equitable equivalent
of its previous rights ....
The Court noted in another case that "[s]o long as the new securities of-
fered are of a value equal to the creditor's claims, the appropriateness of
the formula employed rests in the informed discretion of the court." ' As
a result, the securities must be distributed so that the respective position of
the creditors as to their rank and surrendered rights will be recognized in
the allocation of voting power and control.'
If there is a necessity of seeking new money from a group not having an
equity, the participation accorded them must not be more than the reason-
200Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1943).
201 Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
202 Id.
22In re Warren Bros. Co., 39 F. Supp. 381 (D. Mass. 1941).
"'In re Porto Rican American Tobacco Co., 112 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1940).
as"In re Lorraine Castle Apartments Bldg. Corp., 53 F. Supp. 994 (N.D. Ill. 1944), aff'd, 149
F.2d 55 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945); In re Dover Boiler Works, Inc., 38 F.
Supp. 701 (D.N.J. 1941); In re Mortgage Guarantee Co., 36 F. Supp. 988 (D. Md. 1941).
266In re 620 Church St. Bldg. Corp., 299 U.S. 24 (1936).
20' Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1943); Marine
Harbor Properties, Inc. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 317 U.S. 78 (1942); Consolidated Rock
Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S.
106 (1939); Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
205Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
255 Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 563 (1943).
2 1 0Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510, 529-30 (1941).
.ll In re Tharp Ice Cream Co., 25 F. Supp. 417 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (where proposed plan for
reorganization of an insolvent corporation provided for payment of creditors in preferred stock
and permitted existing stockholders having no equity to retain their stock, creditors were entitled
to full voting control); In re United Rys. & Elec. Co., 11 F. Supp. 717 (D. Md. 1935). See also
In re Chain Inv. Co., 102 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1939).
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able equivalent of their contribution.12 Approval by a large majority of the
creditors" 's or by a state commission" ' does not control the judge's deter-
mination as to the fairness and equity or feasibility of the plan.
The requirement of feasibility is designed to insure that the reorganized
corporation will be in a solvent condition and will have reasonable pros-
pects of financial stability and success."5 The capital structure of the re-
organized company should "be consistent with the value of the under-
lying enterprise . . . [and should] be formulated with reference to the
expected course of income." ' Among the many factors to be considered
by the judge in determining the feasibility of the plan are: (1) debt-
equity ratio;1  (2) amount of fixed charges;" ' (3) amount of proposed
dividends;1 9  (4) provisions for working capital; °  (5) prospective
credit;.21 and (6) sinking fund provisions.2 2 A simple and conservative
capital structure should be created with the dominant purpose being the
survival of the new company.2 3
If the judge finds that the plan meets all of the foregoing requirements
he will confirm it. After confirmation, the plan is binding upon all credi-
tors, whether or not they "are affected by the plan or have accepted it or
have filed proofs of their claims or interests and whether or not their
claims or interests have been scheduled or allowed or are allowable."" All
questions which could have been raised become res judicata."2 ' If the judge
refuses confirmation, either the chapter X proceedings must be dismissed
or bankruptcy liquidation ordered. 26
Substantial Consummation. A plan may be changed until it has been
consummated and a final decree is entered closing the estate.2 . or until it is
deemed substantially consummated.2 A plan is deemed substantially con-
summated if, insofar as applicable, each of the following events has oc-
curred:
112 Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
212Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
114Metropolitan Holding Co. v. Weadock, 113 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1940).
21. Price v. Spokane Silver & Lead Co., 97 F.2d 237 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 626
(1938); In re 333 North Mich. Ave. Bldg. Corp., 84 F.2d 936 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S.
602 (1936).
21In re Indiana Limestone Corp., SEC Release No. 63 (Feb. 2, 1945).
21 See In re Lorraine Castle Apartments Bldg. Corp., 53 F. Supp. 994 (N.D. Ill. 1944),
aff'd, 149 F.2d 55 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945).
218Id. See also In re Waern Bldg. Corp., 145 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S.
871 (1945).
219See In re Waern Bldg. Corp., 145 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 871
(1945); In re Michigan-Ohio Bldg. Corp., 97 F.2d 845 (7th Cir. 1938).
'20 See In re Reo Motor Car Co., 30 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Mich. 1939); In re Pressed Steel Car
Co., 16 F. Supp. 325 (W.D. Pa. 1936); In re Celotex Co., 12 F. Supp. 1 (D. Del. 1935).
22See In re Pressed Steel Car Co., 16 F. Supp. 325 (W.D. Pa. 1936); In re United Ry. &
Elec. Co., 11 F. Supp. 717 (D. Md. 1935).
222 See In re Waern Bldg. Corp., 145 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 871
(1945).
.2 Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).2 4 Bankruptcy Act § 224(1), 11 U.S.C. § 624(1) (1965).
..s Prudence Realization Corp. v. Ferris, 323 U.S. 650 (1945).
220Bankruptcy Act §§ 236, 237, 11 U.S.C. §§ 636, 637 (1965).
227See Mohonk Realty Corp. v. Wise Shoe Stores, Inc., 111 F.2d 287 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 654 (1940).
'28Bankruptcy Act § 229, 11 U.S.C. § 629 (1965).
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(1) transfer, sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of the
property dealt with by the plan pursuant to the provisions of the plan;
(2) assumption of operation of the business and management of all or
substantially all of the property dealt with by the plan by the debtor or by
the corporation used for the purpose of carrying out the plan; and
(3) commencement of the distribution to creditors and stockholders,
affected by the plan, of the cash and securities specified in the plan ....
Any creditor upon proper notice "may apply to the judge for an order
declaring the plan to have been substantially consummated. ' '2  After the
plan has been substantially consummated or an order of substantial con-
summation has been entered, the plan may not be altered or modified if
the proposed alteration or modification would materially and adversely
affect the participation provided for any class of creditors."l After the
final decree is entered, changes cannot be made unless the judge has re-
served the jurisdiction to do so in his final decree12 or the estate is formally
opened again.' Even if the judge has reserved jurisdiction or formally re-
opens the estate, no change may be made if the plan is substantially con-
summated and if such change would materially and adversely affect a par-
ty in interest.'
Distribution. After confirmation, distribution to creditors is then com-
menced under the provisions of the plan. Creditors who filed a proof of
claim which was allowed and those whose claims, not contingent, unliqui-
dated or disputed, were listed by the trustee or debtor in possession will
participate in the distribution.' The latter claims may be objected to, and
the objection must be heard and summarily determined by the court."s
Section 204 provides:
Upon distribution . .. the judge may, upon notice to all persons affected,
fix a time, to expire not sooner than five years after the final decree closing
the estate, within which, as provided in the plan or final decree-
(1 ) the creditors, other than holders of securities, shall file, assign, transfer,
or release their claims; and
(2) the holders of securities shall present or surrender their securities.
After such time no such claim or stock shall participate in the distribution
under the plan."?




212 The Towers' Hotel Corp. v. Lafayette Nat'l Bank, 148 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1945); In re
Tom Moore Distillery Co., 52 F. Supp. 938 (W.D. Ky. 1943).
233 In re Diversey Bldg. Corp., 141 F.2d 65 (7th Cir. 1944); Curtis v. O'Leary, 131 F.2d 240
(8th Cir. 1942); Mohonk Realty Corp. v. Wise Shoe Stores, Inc., 111 F.2d 287 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 654 (1940).
234 See H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1952). See also S. REp. No. 1395, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1952).23 Bankruptcy Act 224(4), 11 U.S.C. § 624(4) (1965). See In re Realty Associates Secs.
Corp., 58 F. Supp. 220 (E.D.N.Y. 1944) (excess assets over those needed to continue debtor's
regular business could be distributed to bondholders, whether or not a plan had been proposed);
In re Realty Associates Secs. Corp., 53 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D.N.Y. 1943) (payment of small mer-
chandise or service claimants before plan is approved).
236Bankruptcy Act § 225, 11 U.S.C. § 625 (1965).
""Bankruptcy Act § 204, 11 U.S.C. § 604 (1965).
[Vol. 22
COMMENT
the expiration of the time fixed ...or of any extension thereof, shall be-
come the property of the debtor or of the new corporation acquiring the
assets of the debtor under the plan, as the case may be, free and clear of
any and all claims and interest. ' ' "s
Property dealt with in the plan becomes free and clear of all claims and
interests of creditors, except those claims and interests otherwise provided
for in the plan, the confirming order, the transfer order, or the retention
order."' The Act provides for a final decree "discharging the debtor from
all its debts and liabilities ...except as provided in the plan or in the
order confirming the plan or in the order directing or authorizing the
transfer or retention of property."'  The final decree may also include an
injunction prohibiting all suits or actions by creditors interfering with the
plan ."
VIII. COMPENSATION AND ALLOWANCES
Compensation and allowances may be given to creditors, committees, or
representatives and their attorneys or agents in a reorganization proceed-
ing. The judge is given broad discretion in fixing the compensation and
allowances. 4 ' In determining allowances, the judge must first decide whether
the services are compensable or the expenses are reimbursable, and then
determine the amount to be allowed." The claimant has the burden of
proving that his claim comes within those allowed by statute' and the
value of his services.2 "
Since each claim must stand on its own footing, it is hard to develop
general rules governing the allowance of claims. Economy of administra-
tion, however, is clearly the basic aim.' The words "proper" and "rea-
sonable" in the various sections on compensation and allowances require
the judge to look at the value of the debtor's estate, the amount available
for allowances, and the ability of the reorganized company to meet these
obligations.2 In specific instances, the judge should also consider the ne-
228 Bankruptcy Act § 205, 11 U.S.C. § 605 (1965).
2. Bankruptcy Act § 226, 11 U.S.C. § 626 (1965).
2 4 Bankruptcy Act § 228(1), 11 U.S.C. § 628(1) (1965). Discharge of a debtor does not
discharge or affect the liability of a co-debtor, guarantor, indorser, insurer, or other surety. In re
Nine North Church St., Inc., 82 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1936); In re Diversey Bldg. Corp., 86 F.2d
456 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 662 (1937). Note that the discharge may be set aside.
See Bankruptcy Act 5§ 2a(12), 102, 11 U.S.C. 55 Ila(12), 502 (1965). The final decree will
not be vacated when rights of third persons have intervened and those rights would be affected.
Curtis v. O'Leary, 131 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1942); Standard Steel Works v. American Pipe &
Steel Corp., 111 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1940).24 tBankruptcy Act § 228(3), 11 U.S.C. § 628(3) (1965). See Mar-Tex Realization Corp. v.
Wolfson, 145 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1944) (the injunction supersedes any injunctions or stays en-
tered during the course of the proceeding).
242Dickinson Industrial Site, Inc. v. Cowan, 309 U.S. 382 (1940); In re Mountain States
Power Co., 118 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1941) (if allowances are so grossly inadequate as to constitute
an abuse of discretion, the appellate court may raise them).
.
43 Stark v. Woods Bros., 109 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1940).
244 Gochenour v. Cleveland Terminals Bldg. Co., 142 F.2d 991 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 767 (1944); Cooke v. Bowersock, 122 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1941).
24 Woods v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262 (1941).
24 Greensfelder v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 114 F.2d 53 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 714
(1940); Milbank, Tweed & Hope v. McCue, 111 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1940); Straus v. Baker Co.,
87 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1937).
247In re Solar Mfg. Corp., 215 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1954); Finn v. Childs Co., 181 F.2d 431
(2d Cir. 1950); Stark v. Woods Bros. Corp., 109 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1940).
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cessity and extent of the services, the experience and skill required, and
the responsibilities assumed.us In the final analysis, the test becomes one of
benefit to the debtor's estate and the security holders. 4 A denial of allow-
ances for compensation does not necessarily result in a denial of reimburse-
ment for proper cost and expenses incurred. 5
The Act provides for reimbursement, in the judge's discretion, for proper
costs and expenses of the petitioning creditors and reasonable costs for
services and reimbursement for proper costs and expenses of their at-
torney."' Since the Act separates the provisions for the petitioning credi-
tors from the provisions for their attorneys, the attorney must secure his
compensation himself and the creditors cannot include it in their claims. 52
The attorney may be denied an allowance for his services and/or reim-
bursement for his expenses if the reorganization was not instituted in
good faith." The attorney may not "share or agree to share his compen-
sation . . . with any person not contributing thereto, or share or agree to
share in the compensation of any person . . . to which he has not con-
tributed . . . . [H]owever, . . . an attorney-at-law may share such com-
pensation with a law partner or with a forwarding attorney-at-law, and
may share in the compensation of a law partner." ' The attorney must file
a "petition setting forth the value and extent of the services rendered, the
amount requested and what allowances, if any, have theretofore been made
to him."'' The petition must be accompanied by his affidavit stating
whether he has an agreement with any other person for a division of com-
pensation. If the attorney violates the provision against sharing his com-
pensation, it will be withheld.5"'
Committees or representatives of creditors and their attorneys or agents
are allowed, in the judge's discretion, reasonable compensation for services
and reimbursement for proper costs and expenses incurred in connection
with the administration of the estate or a plan approved by the judge, re-
gardless of whether it is accepted or confirmed. 5 ' Compensation and al-
... in re Solar Mfg. Corp., 215 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1954); In re Detroit Int'l Bridge Co., 111
F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1940).
24 Dickinson Industrial Site, Inc. v. Cowan, 309 U.S. 382 (1940).
"'See, e.g., In re Paramount-Publix Corp., 12 F. Supp. 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1935), rev'd on other
grounds, 83 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1936).2
stBankruptcy Act § 241, 11 U.S.C. § 641 (1965). See In re Arcade Malleable Iron Co., 35
F. Supp. 461 (D. Mass. 1940) (the § 132 filing fee is included in proper costs and expenses al-
lowable to petitioning creditors). For an attorney the allowance of compensation includes the
ordinary expenses of operating a law office. In rc Tom Moore Distillery Co., 52 F. Supp. 938
(W.D. Ky. 1943); In re National Radiator Co., 29 F. Supp. 804 (W.D. Pa. 1939); Watters v.
Hamilton Gas Co., 29 F. Supp. 436 (S.D.W. Va. 1939), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 111 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1940). Proper cost and expenses are those not a necessary inci-
dent to the attorney's employment. In re Mercantile Arcade Realty Corp., 20 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.
Cal. 1937).
252 In re Arcade Malleable Iron Co., 35 F. Supp. 461 (D. Mass. 1940). For an example of an
allowance to the petitioning creditors' attorney, see In re Condor Pictures, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 174
(S.D. Cal. 1939), aff'd, 112 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1940). For a discussion concerning the measure
of compensation awarded to petitioning creditors' attorneys, see Johnson v. Carolina Scenic Stages,
242 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1957).
as General Order 43 (applicable in chapter X cases under General Order 52(2)).
2 4
Bankruptcy Act § 62c, 11 U.S.C. § 102c (1965).
255 Bankruptcy Act § 62d, 11 U.S.C. § 102d (1965).
258 Id.
.. Bankruptcy Act § 242, 11 U.S.C. § 642 (1965).
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lowance here may include work done prior to the chapter X proceeding,
but the work must have had some direct relation to the reorganization" 8
and no reimbursement will be allowed when the service is primarily ren-
dered in the sole interest of the individual or group represented.26 Also,
if the claimant does some act which is the function or duty of the trustee,
debtor in possession, or some other officer of the estate, he is not entitled to
reimbursement unless he secured the judge's authorization to proceed after
demonstrating the officer's inability or unwillingness to act.6 There is a
split of authority on whether compensation and allowances can be given
if the reorganization is disrupted before a plan is approved."s Compensa-
tion and allowances should be given since (1) reimbursement should not
depend on the outcome of the reorganization; (2) activity is contem-
plated and encouraged by those involved; and (3) the statutory provi-
sion allowing compensation "in connection with the administration of the
estate" is broad enough to cover this situation. 62
A committee of the creditors need not formally intervene in order to be
entitled to allowances,"' and more than one committee may exist for a
class of creditors. In this situation duplication of services should not be a
basis for the denial of reimbursement.!" Of course, where there is an
actual, clear and unnecessary duplication, a denial may follow;6 5 but if the
different committees are entitled to function, they should likewise be en-
titled to reimbursement.6
Since committees and attorneys are fiduciaries, compensation and/or
allowances may be denied by the judge if a conflict of interest exists. 7
Similarly, the judge may reimburse part of the committee instead of the
whole, even though the committee agreement provides otherwise.266
In addition, reasonable compensation for services and reimbursement
for proper costs and expenses may, in the judge's discretion, be granted
to creditors and their attorneys in connection with (1) the submission
by them of suggestions for a plan or proposals in the form of plans; or (2)
2' Finn v. Childs Co., 181 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1950); In re Detroit Int'l Bridge Co., 111 F.2d
235 (6th Cir. 1940).
2591n re Craigie Arms, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 110 (D. Mass. 1943) (no allowance for attempt to
secure interest on mortgage or for pressing claim which was finally compromised); In re National
Radiator Co., 29 F. Supp. 804 (W.D. Pa. 1939) (no allowance for activity of attorney in at-
tempting to obtain a preferred classification for the class of creditors represented).
260Gochenour v. Cleveland Terminals Bldg. Co., 142 F.2d 991 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 767 (1944); Sartorious v. Bardo, 95 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1938).
261 For a case that answers in the negative because of a lack of benefit, see In re Waverly
Furniture Co., 36 F. Supp. 188 (N.D.N.Y. 1940). For cases answering in the affirmative, see
In re Columbia Ribbon Co., 117 F.2d 999 (3d Cir. 1941); In re Old Algiers, Inc., 25 F. Supp.
509 (S.D.N.Y. 1938). A similar problem arises under § 243. For a case answering in the negative,
see In re Childs Co., 52 F. Supp. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). For a case answering in the affirmative, see
In re William J. Lemp Brewing Co., 45 F, Supp. 400 (E.D. Ill. 1942).
262 6A COLLIER 5 13.06, at 596-98.
262 in re Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 105 F.2d 358 (3d Cir. 1939).
2
1
4 See Finn v. Childs Co., 181 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1950).
215In re Starrett Corp., 92 F.2d 375 (3d Cir. 1937).
266 In re Mountain States Power Co., 118 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1941).
26 Woods v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262 (1941).
211In re Baldwin Locomotive Works, 35 F. Supp. 773 (E.D. Pa. 1940). See In re Detroit
Int'l Bridge Co., III F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1940) (allowance to a committee will be denied if the




objections by them to the confirmation of the plan; or (3) the adminis-
tration of the estate."' The judge may give consideration only to claims
for services, costs and expenses which were beneficial in the administration
of the estate or which contributed to the confirmed plan, or to a refusal
to confirm a plan."
A creditor who is a member of a class with no equity in the debtor's
property may receive compensation or reimbursement for himself or his
attorney if he comes within the terms of the section." 1 Unsuccessful op-
position is denied compensation by the precise wording of the section since
the services must contribute to the refusal of confirmation."'
When the compensation and allowance provisions are read with either
section 246 or section 259, the judge has the discretion to grant compen-
sation and allowances even though the reorganization is a failure and (1)
the proceeding is either dismissed or bankruptcy liquidation ordered, ' or
(2) the proceeding is dismissed and a prior, superseded non-bankruptcy
proceeding is reinstated. 4
Compensation and allowances may be made only upon notice and hear-
ing." All claimants for compensation and allowance must:
file with the court a statement under oath showing the claims against, or
stock of, the debtor, if any, in which a beneficial interest, direct or indirect,
has been acquired or transferred by him or for his account, after the com-
mencement of such proceeding. No compensation or reimbursement shall be
allowed to any committee or attorney, or other person acting in the proceed-
ings in a representative or fiduciary capacity, who at any time after assuming
to act in such capacity has purchased or sold such claims or stock, or by
whom or for whose account such claims or stock have, without the prior
2"Bankruptcy Act § 243, 11 U.S.C. § 643 (1965).
270 Id.
271 In re Utilities Power & Light Corp., 33 F. Supp. 347 (N.D. Ill. 1940). But cf. Watters v.
Hamilton Gas Co., 29 F. Supp. 436 (S.D.W. Va. 1939), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 111 F.2d 100
(4th Cir. 1940).
272 In every other circumstance, the opposition is entitled to compensation and allowance even
if unsuccessful as long as it meets the other requirements. In re Equitable Office Bldg. Corp., 83
F. Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y.), revid on other grounds, 175 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1949). Some courts
find no compensable benefit because of a duplication of services. See In re Porto Rican Am.
Tobacco Co., 117 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1941); In re Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 61
F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
2 7 2
Bankruptcy Act S 246, 11 U.S.C. § 646 (1965). See In re Columbia Ribbon Co., 117 F.2d
999 (3d Cir. 1941).2 74
Bankruptcy Act S 259, 11 U.S.C. § 659 (1965). See Smith v. Central Trust Co., 139
F.2d 733 (4th Cir. 1944). Note that there is a disagreement as to whether administrative ex-
penses may be charged against all of the debtor's property. For a case in the affirmative, see In re
Gage County Elec. Co., CCH FED. BANKING L. RE. 3 52,602 (1940). For cases that say that
secured creditors must participate in the reorganization proceeding, or must derive benefit from
or consent to or cause the activities for which the allowances are allowed before administrative
expenses can be charged against secured assets, see In re Sheridan View Bldg. Corp., 154 F.2d 1008
(7th Cir. 1946); John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Casey, 139 F.2d 207 (1st Cir. 1943).
When a reorganization petition is filed in a pending bankruptcy, reasonable compensation for
services and reimbursement for proper costs and expenses in the pending bankruptcy proceeding, if
not already allowed, may be allowed, in the judge's discretion, to the attorney for petitioning cre-
ditors and to any other person and his attorney entitled to compensation or reimbursement in a
bankruptcy proceeding. Bankruptcy Act § 244, 11 U.S.C. § 644 (1965).
275 Bankruptcy Act § 247, 11 U.S.C. § 647 (1965). See Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178
(1944). Bankruptcy Act § 250, 11 U.S.C. § 650 (1965) provides for appeals from orders granting
or refusing to grant compensation and/or allowances.
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consent or subsequent approval of the judge, been otherwise acquired or
transferred." 6
Even though the section specifically applies to the acquisition or transfer
after the commencement of the proceeding, it has been held that such a
transaction before the commencement would disqualify the claimant if he
was acting in a representative capacity at the time of the transaction."
The judge's prior consent or subsequent approval will not qualify a vol-
untary transaction, but rather will qualify only involuntary transactions,
such as a testamentary bequest or an inheritance."'
The "direct or indirect" beneficial interest language of the statute has
caused some conflicts. It has been suggested that this language applies to
trading in the stock of a holding corporation owning the stock or bonds
of the debtor 79 and also the trading in the securities of a subsidiary of the
debtor,' but as to the latter there is a contra holding. s' Similarly, it has
been held that an attorney for a bondholders' committee does not lose his
allowance if his wife trades in the debtor's securities independently, with-
out the consent, advice or knowledge of her husband.2"' But in another case
allowances were denied where members of the immediate family traded
in the debtor's securities.' A lawyer will not be able to collect his com-
pensation and allowances when his partner trades in debtor's securities.' "
But an attorney is not precluded from collecting compensation and al-
lowances if the person he represents is so precluded.' Both the forfeiture
of future compensation and the forfeiture and return of compensation al-
ready received is required if these provisions are not obeyed." 6
IX. CONCLUSION
The elaborate and complicated provisions for corporate reorganization
under the Bankruptcy Act should not dismay the practitioner. Chapter X
was enacted for the protection of the creditors, and even small creditors
may benefit from intervention at certain points of the reorganization pro-
ceeding. It is hoped that the preceding pages of this Comment will give
some guidance to those not intimately familiar with the intricacies of
chapter X so that they may represent their clients more efficiently and with
a keener understanding of the difficult problems involved.
176Bankruptcy Act § 249, 11 U.S.C. § 649 (1965) (emphasis added). After the statement
has been filed, the burden is upon the challenger to show a violation of the section. Berner v.
Equitable Office Bldg. Corp., 175 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1949).
...In re Cosgrove-Meehan Coal Corp., 136 F.2d 3 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 777 (1943).
1
7 8 Otis & Co. v. Insurance Bldg. Corp., 110 F.2d 333 (1st Cir. 1940). Note that approval is
a matter of judicial discretion. In re 188 Randolph Bldg. Corp., 151 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1945).
See In re Cosgrove-Meehan Coal Corp., 136 F.2d 3 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 777 (1943)
(pledge's sale of debtor's securities).
'
7
"In re Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 61 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
In re Midland United Co., 64 F. Supp. 399 (D. Del. 1946).
'In re Central States Elec. Corp., 112 F. Supp. 281 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 206 F.2d 70 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 899 (1953). See also Hearings on H.R. 8046 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1937-1938).
.s. In re Philadelphia & Reading Coal &. Iron Co., 61 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
'SIn re Midland United Co., 64 F. Supp. 399 (D. Del. 1946).
21
4 Id.; In re Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 37 F. Supp. 708 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
'8'Silbiger v. Prudence Bonds Corp., 180 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1950).
2s Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633 (1963).
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